Unit:
Department of LawLibrary of the School of Law
Author:
Anastopoulou Elli-Kyriaki
Dissertation committee:
1. Χρήστος Γκόρτος, Καθηγητής Νομικής Σχολής ΕΚΠΑ (επιβλέπων)
2. Σπυρίδων Βλαχόπουλος, Καθηγητής Νομικής Σχολής ΕΚΠΑ
3. Αικατερίνη Ηλιάδου, Αναπλ. Καθηγήτρια Νομικής Σχολής ΕΚΠΑ
4. Θεοδώρα Αντωνίου, Καθηγήτρια Νομικής Σχολής ΕΚΠΑ
5. Χρήστος Χατζηεμμανουήλ, Καθηγητής, Διεθνών & Ευρωπαϊκών Σπουδών, Πανεπιστήμιο Πειραιώς
6. Νικόλαος Παπασπύρου, Αναπλ. Καθηγητής Νομικής Σχολής ΕΚΠΑ
7. Νικόλαος Σημαντήρας, Επίκ. Καθηγητής Νομικής Σχολής ΕΚΠΑ
Original Title:
Liability of Supervisory and Resolution Authorities in the European Banking Union. The escape room of the ‘sufficiently serious breach’ test, compensatory immunity and composite procedures and the unspoken loopholes in the protection of fundamental rights
Translated title:
Liability of Supervisory and Resolution Authorities in the European Banking Union. The escape room of the ‘sufficiently serious breach’ test, compensatory immunity and composite procedures and the unspoken loopholes in the protection of fundamental rights
Summary:
The well-known concept of non-contractual liability constitutes the beating heart of this Thesis. In particular, the research topic of the Thesis is narrowed down to the complex realm of the non-contractual liability of the financial authorities, namely the supervisory and resolution authorities on EU and national level. The Thesis research pinpoints fundamental aspects of the statutory provisions and the pertinent case-law governing the non-contractual liability on Union level, as well as on Greek law level, whilst the status quo in other EU jurisdictions is also examined.
Financial authorities, such as central banks, regulatory agencies, and supervisory bodies, play a crucial role in maintaining the stability and efficiency of the financial system. Their actions encompass a wide range of activities, including setting monetary policy, overseeing banks and financial institutions, and enforcing compliance with regulatory standards or taking resolution action. As supervisory bodies tasked with overseeing and ensuring the stability and integrity of financial markets, these authorities wield considerable power and influence. While their primary objective is to safeguard the overall stability and protect the interests of various stakeholders, there are instances where their decisions or omissions can result in harm to individuals, market participants, or the broader economy.
The Thesis provides an answer to the dilemma of whether the financial authorities should enjoy immunity from liability, or they should be held liable for the damage they caused during the performance of their duties. It also focuses on the potential limitations that are applied to the liability of the financial authorities by exploring the question of whether the current liability framework offers for ‘too much or too little’ liability, analysing also the compensatory immunity granted to financial authorities when a guarantee scheme is in place and the unspoken loopholes in the protection of the right to property which emerge in the context of the EU resolution framework, and the bail-in tool. The Thesis further devotes particular attention to identifying accountability gaps between the ECB and respective competent national authorities which should be bridged whereas it equally puts great emphasis on the challenging issue of effective judicial protection in the composite procedures.
Main subject category:
Law and Legislation
Keywords:
non-contractual liability, liability, TFEU 340, ECB, SRB, BoG, Bank of Greece, Francovich, European Union, sufficiently serious breach, compensatory immunity, composite procedures, protection of fundamental rights, right to property, supervision, resolution, European Banking Union, financial authorities, accountability, democratic legitimacy
Number of references:
826
